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Organizing for Value Appropriation:  
Configurations and Performance Outcomes of Price Management 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Value creation and value appropriation are fundamental strategic processes (Ghemawat 1991; 
Obloj & Capron, 2011; Reitzig and Puranam, 2009). They can be analyzed at the level of the 
individual manager, at an organizational level, or more generally related to systems such as business 
relationships, networks or society (Lepak, Smith & Taylor, 2007).  Strategic management focuses 
primarily on the organizational level of value-related aspects and studies value creation and 
appropriation in different contexts, such as entrepreneurial opportunity recognition (e.g. Mahnke, 
Venzin, & Zahra, 2007), alliance management (Ness, 2009), or framing of innovation (van Burg, 
Berends, & van Raaji, . 
Value creation and value appropriation have been researched with regard to their effects and 
determinants (e.g. Blocker, Cannon, Panagopoulos, & Sager, 2012; Obloj & Capron 2011; Priem, 
2007), or their interactions and trade-offs (e.g. Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Mizik & Jacobsen, 
2003). However, it has been argued that “these developments have been curiously one-sided, with the 
emphasis on […] value creation rather than value appropriation.” (Reitzig & Puranam, 2009, p. 765). 
This asymmetry in scholarly interest is all the more surprising given that value appropriation “is 
arguably the main objective of firms” (Pitelis, 2009, p. 1124). 
While value creation is important as a determinant of a firm’s competitive advantage, value 
appropriation refers to the degree to which a firm can capitalize on this advantage, i.e. to what extent 
it can extract value based on its competitive position (Mizik & Jacobsen, 2003). MacDonald and Ryall 
(2004) argue that competition determines whether a company can capture (i.e. appropriate) value. The 
more effective a company is in value appropriation, the better it is able to avoid value slippage, i.e. a 
situation where the firm creating a substantial part of value in a value network does not retain a 
corresponding share of the value it creates (Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007; Parolini, 1999). Hence, 
extracting value from customers (i.e. monetary sacrifices) in exchange for value created by an 
offering, and retaining a maximum of this value in vertical competition within a value system (i.e. vis-
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à-vis suppliers) is a key challenge for firms. Consequently, value appropriation is seen as a core 
organizational capability (Reitzig & Puranam, 2009). 
In the context of value appropriation the general management literature has consistently 
stressed the importance of price (Hinterhuber, 2004; Monroe & Della Bitta, 1978; Rao, 1984). Pricing 
decisions affect firm profitability arguably more, and more directly, than any other business decision, 
and sound pricing has been regarded as a source of competitive advantage (Dutta, Zbaracki & Bergen, 
2003). Although firms’ awareness of the critical role of pricing has been increasing over the last two 
decades, there still exists some lack of knowledge about certain pricing aspects in managerial practice 
as well as in scholarly research (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010a). Some issues of pricing as an 
organizational value appropriation capability are well researched, for example pricing strategy (e.g. 
Forman & Hunt, 2005; Morris & Calantone, 1990), partly because of the immediate impact of getting 
pricing decisions wrong: Netflix's pricing fiasco in the U.S. in 2011 represents such a case.  Netflix 
raised the price of its DVD-streaming bundle by almost 50%, resulting in a severe customer backlash, 
with the loss of almost 30% of its subscriber base of about 25mio. customers, and a 50% reduced 
share price. However, the same emphasis has not yet been given to issues about how to organize for 
pricing, although extant surveys of pricing professionals show that such organizational aspects are 
top-of-mind in practical value appropriation management (Homburg, Jensen & Hahn, 2012; Noble & 
Gruca, 1999; Roll, 2009).  
Dutta et al. (2003) have argued that pricing is an organizational capability, which is linked to 
firm’s organizational design choices. Such choices are important aspects of practical pricing 
management: in the automotive supply industry with its oligopolistic demand structure, supplier 
companies had to find optimal pricing organization designs by organizing ‘near to the customer’. 
Thus, sales teams linked to project structures are responsible for pricing (in coordination with the 
controlling function), with the marketing department being side-lined. Other companies, such as a 
German tool manufacturer, developed new organizational structures around ‘in-house pricing 
consultants’ who are assigned to bidding teams for project acquisition activities (Batten, 2011). 
Despite increasing attention regarding the importance of pricing, challenges to 
organizationally implementing pricing activities persist, resulting in many companies failing to take 
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advantage of value appropriation opportunities (Hinterhuber, 2008; Ingenbleek, 2007). Contrary to 
assumptions of prior research, pricing is neither easy nor costless (e.g. Dutta et al., 1999; Bergen et al., 
2003). Profitable pricing as part of successful value appropriation involves considerable process costs 
(Dutta, Zbaracki & Bergen, 2003; Zbaracki et al., 2004) and can arouse intense intra-organizational 
controversy (Lancioni, Schau & Smith, 2005), making a firm’s lack of enthusiasm for dealing with 
organizational pricing challenges more understandable: “Few challenges cause more anxiety for 
senior executives than the implementation of pricing strategies” (Nagle, Hogan & Zale, 2011, p. 174). 
In an attempt to better understand value appropriation issues, recent academic work has paid 
greater attention to the organizational context of pricing. Several authors note that prior studies have 
neglected such organizational aspects of pricing (Carricano, Trinquecoste & Mondejar, 2010; 
Ingenbleek, 2007), and conceptual articles argued that failure to use advanced pricing approaches 
might be ascribed to the organizational context of pricing (Ingenbleek, 2007). Practical concerns by 
managers underline the relevance of a systematic pricing organization to make a difference: 
“Successful companies deliberately build a strong pricing infrastructure that underpins and sustains 
pricing excellence” (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010a, p. 2). 
Recent value appropriation research most frequently studies selected and traditional 
bureaucratic organizational dimensions. For instance, some researchers have examined specialized 
pricing functions (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010b; Carricano, Trinquecoste & Mondejar, 2010; Nagle, 
Hogan & Zale, 2011), as well as issues around formalization (Argouslidis & Indounas, 2010; 
Ingenbleek, 2007), and centralization (Cavusgil, Kwong Chan & Chun Zhang, 2003; Frenzen et al., 
2010; Homburg, Jensen & Hahn, 2012). They found that pricing organization may vary considerably 
among firms (Smith, 1995). 
However, the variety of approaches to pricing organization across companies has not been 
investigated on the basis of large-scale empirical evidence. Often, uni-dimensional concepts are used. 
The result is not only a dearth of empirical research that systematically explores pricing organization 
but also the absence of a conceptual framework that includes a variety of relevant dimensions of 
pricing organization. To rectify this important gap, this paper builds on prior conceptual groundwork 
that discusses prototypes of pricing organization both conceptually and anecdotally (Baker, Marn and 
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Zawada, 2010b; Carricano, Trinquecoste & Mondejar, 2010; Nagle, Hogan & Zale, 2011; Smith, 
1995). From this starting point, we develop an integrative conceptual framework for pricing 
organization and use data from 419 business units in the B2B sector that allow for the exploratory 
analysis of different configurations of pricing organizations and their performance implications.  
Doing so, our study contributes to existing research by deriving the core characteristics of 
pricing organizations as part of an integrative conceptualization; by validating measurement 
instruments for these core characteristics; by identifying different configurational approaches to 
pricing organization in practice on the basis of a large-scale taxonomy, and by testing the relationship 
between different pricing organization approaches and organizational outcome variables. 
The remainder of this article has the following structure. We review the literature on pricing 
organization and related research, and identify and introduce fundamental dimensions of pricing 
organization. We then outline our data collection and measurement approach and describe the 
taxonomical procedures. We present the taxonomy and the performance implications of 
configurations, and finally we discuss implications for academic research and managerial practice. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Research on pricing organization 
During the last two decades, the management literature has increasingly considered pricing to be not 
just a one-time decision but a continuing organizational process (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010b; 
Dutta, Zbaracki & Bergen, 2003; Shipley & Jobber, 2001; Smith, 1995), requiring therefore the 
management of a set of interdependent activities (Shipley & Jobber, 2001). Building on previous 
frameworks, four critical decision fields can be identified: strategic pricing decisions, list or target 
price decisions, transactional pricing decisions, and price controlling (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010b; 
Dutta, Zbaracki & Bergen, 2003; Farley, Hulbert & Weinstein, 1980; Hinterhuber, 2004; Lancioni, 
2005; Shipley & Jobber, 2001). 
Activity-based research tends to focus on the activities related to such decision fields. So far, 
structural organizational issues play a minor role in this context, despite the findings of research on 
comparable marketing and management processes showing that such organizational aspects are a 
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major concern (Cadogan et al., 2005; Homburg, Workman & Jensen, 2002; Menon et al., 1999). 
While our study draws on an activity-based perspective of pricing, it takes the position that pricing 
organization is the structure that buttresses the pricing process, and therefore needs to be considered 
especially.  
A review of the literature shows that few authors have addressed pricing organization either in 
a holistic manner, or related to specific organizational dimensions. Prior research can be divided into 
three categories (appendix 1): (1) studies that focus explicitly on pricing organization, (2) 
investigations that draw implicitly on the notion of pricing organization, and (3) examinations of 
single dimensions of pricing organization in a narrow context. Based on the analyzed literature, five 
main dimensions of pricing organization are identified: formalization, centralization, specialization, 
dispersion of influence, and top-management involvement.  
Studies in category 1 consider pricing organization within a cross-functional decision-making 
process, with the most comprehensive conceptual framework being provided by Smith (1995). This 
view comes closest to our understanding of pricing organization, as it regards organizational 
dimensions as characteristics of decision-making processes in pricing. This line of research is largely 
conceptual (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010b; Nagle, Hogan & Zale, 2011; Smith, 1995), with some 
contributions being based on anecdotal evidence (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010a; Shapiro, 1983). The 
one empirical study in this category is based on qualitative interview data (Carricano, Trinquecoste & 
Mondejar, 2010). Some studies in this category suggest typologies describing several stages of the 
development of pricing organization (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010b; Carricano, Trinquecoste & 
Mondejar, 2010; Nagle, Hogan & Zale, 2011; Smith, 1995). 
The second category of studies does not focus directly on pricing organization. However, 
descriptions within the studies suggest that pricing decisions are deeply embedded in organizational 
structures, and especially case study-based research implicitly refers to several dimensions of pricing 
organization (Dutta, Zbaracki & Bergen, 2003; Zbaracki & Bergen, 2010). For instance, pricing is 
described as a cross-functional process that includes several decision makers. Evidence is given for 
specialized pricing jobs and formalized procedures. Empirical studies examine the intra-organizational 
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environment of pricing (Lancioni, 2005), and other aspects are addressed by conceptual research 
(Hinterhuber, 2008; Ingenbleek, 2007) as well as anecdotal accounts (Smith & Nagle, 1994).  
Category 3 comprises studies of single dimensions of pricing organization, primarily in two 
contexts. In the context of international pricing the literature has examined the issues of centralization 
(Alonso, Dessein & Matouschek, 2008; Cavusgil, Kwong Chan & Chun Zhang, 2003; Myers, 
Cavusgil & Diamantopoulos, 2002; Picard, Boddewyn & Grosse, 1998; Samiee, 1987; Solberg, 
Stöttinger & Yaprak, 2006; Stöttinger, 2001), as well as of formalization (Argouslidis & Indounas, 
2010; Tzokas et al., 2000). In the context of transactional pricing (rather than the overall pricing 
process), especially the organizational dimension of centralization as the extent to which the firm 
delegates pricing authority to the sales force is explored. Research in this area is both empirical 
(Frenzen et al., 2010; Stephenson, Cron & Frazier, 1979) and analytical (Bhardwaj, 2001; Kissan, 
2001; Mishra & Prasad, 2004). 
The five main organizational dimensions, which can be synthesized from these three 
categories of studies on pricing organization are:  
Formalization. The degree of formalization in pricing organizations differ between firms. 
Some pricing organizations are based on codified pricing processes (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010a; 
Smith, 1995), others on less structured ad-hoc approaches (Smith, 1995).  
Centralization. This relates to discussions about how hierarchically centralized pricing should 
be, both in an activity-based context (i.e. covering the overall pricing context) (Smith 1995), and in a 
narrow context of transactional pricing (Bhardwaj, 2001; Frenzen et al., 2010; Kissan, 2001; Mishra & 
Prasad, 2004, 2005; Shipley &  Jobber, 2001).  
Specialization. This relates to the organizational implementation decision of either purely 
cross-functional organizations of pricing on the one hand, or the development of specialized roles 
dedicated to pricing activities (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010b; Carricano, Trinquecoste & Mondejar 
2010; Nagle, Hogan & Zale, 2011).  
 Dispersion of Influence. Case studies describe cross-functional price decisions (Capon, Farley 
& Hulbert, 1975; Cyert & March, 1963; Dutta, Zbaracki & Bergen, 2003; Farley & Howard, 1971; 
Zbaracki and Bergen, 2010). Empirical research in management shows that sales, marketing, and 
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controlling can jointly influence pricing decisions (Homburg, Workman & Krohmer, 1999; Krohmer, 
Homburg & Workman, 2002; Lancioni, Schau & Smith, 2005; Troilo, de Luca & Guenzi, 2009; 
Verhoef & Leeflang, 2009).  
 Top-down involvement. Pricing success depends largely on the extent to which organizations 
emphasize continuous improvement of pricing capabilities in a directive manner, through management 
guidelines (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010b; Lancioni, Schau & Smith, 2005; Mizik & Jacobson, 
2003). The strategy literature explains this arguing that an organization is the reflection of its top 
management team (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).   
This literature analysis reveals several issues in pricing research that we aim to address. Our 
first observation is that prior research appears to be fragmented and mostly tends to study only single 
dimensions of pricing organization, thereby yielding no consolidated and integrative framework, 
which looks at configurations of such organizational dimensions. Moreover, quantitative empirical 
work on pricing organization is largely missing. Even though examinations include anecdotal and 
conceptual work as well as interview-based research, investigators have not developed validated 
empirical measures. Finally, while previous researchers have mentioned several organizational 
prototypes (Carricano, Trinquecoste & Mondejar, 2010; Smith, 1995), no study has used a large-scale 
setting to empirically analyze configurations of how companies organize for pricing, as well as their 
impact on value appropriation. 
2.2. Related research 
As pricing is an area of management with strong links to marketing, we consider research on 
marketing organization to be of relevance for our research question. Research on marketing 
organization has dealt with several topics that fall within the scope of this study.  
First, investigators have proposed various conceptual frameworks for the organization of 
marketing activities (Håkansson & Östberg, 1975; Ruekert, Walker & Roering, 1985; Workman, 
Homburg & Gruner, 1998). Building on this line of research, we ensure that both structural and 
nonstructural dimensions of organization are included in our framework (Workman, Homburg & 
Gruner, 1998). Structural dimensions consist of conventional bureaucratic aspects such as 
formalization, specialization, and centralization (Hage & Aiken, 1967; Pugh, Hickson & Hinings, 
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1969; Pugh et al., 1963). Nonstructural dimensions, such as top-management involvement, “have 
received increasing attention in marketing literature because there has been greater managerial locus 
on the use of cross-functional teams” (Workman, Homburg & Gruner, 1998, p. 27). Thus, our 
conceptualization reflects current thinking within the broader context of organization research at the 
firm-market interface. 
Secondly, our literature review reveals that specific and established empirical scales on pricing 
organization are scant. However, investigators in other fields have developed scales to measure 
organizational dimensions (Dastmalchian & Boag, 1990; Olson, Slater & Hult, 2005; Vorhies & 
Morgan, 2003; Cadogan et al., 2005; Workman, Homburg & Jensen, 2003; Krohmer, Homburg & 
Workman, 2002; Troilo, de Luca & Guenzi, 2009; Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Song, Xie & Dyer, 2000; 
Verhoef & Leeflang, 2009). More recently, cluster analysis has come to be regarded as a useful tool 
for achieving further insights into intra-organizational issues such as different organizational 
configurations. Recent studies have used such taxonomies to explore how firms organize key account 
management (Homburg, Workman & Jensen, 2002) and the marketing–sales interface (Homburg, 
Jensen & Krohmer, 2008), as well as how firms relate to their markets and their customers (Cannon & 
Perreault, 1999). Some of these studies have included the examination of performance implications, 
thus establishing a link between organizational pattern and performance, which is grounded in 
configurative approaches of organizational analysis (Ketchen et al., 1997; Meyer, Tsui & Hinings, 
1993; Vorhies & Morgan, 2003). 
 
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Fundamental organizational dimensions 
Formalization. Formalization is probably the most frequently studied organizational 
dimension (Homburg, Jensen & Krohmer, 2008; Vlaar, van gen Bosch & Volberda, 2006). However, 
empirical research on the role of formalization in pricing is sparse. Formalization in pricing is 
generally considered to be rather low. “At many companies, the processes for making critical pricing 
decisions have a random, even reactive feel: they lack the structure, thoroughness, and underlying 
analytics that such profit-sensitive decisions deserve.” (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010a, pp. 2,3). 
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However, formalization in terms of clearly defined roles and responsibilities is an important 
organizational dimension of pricing processes (Smith, 1995; Atkin & Skinner, 1977; Carricano, 
Trinquecoste & Mondejar, 2010; Nagle, Hogan & Zale, 2011; Shapiro, 1983). This is reflected by 
Nagle et al. (2011) who note “failure to formally allocate pricing decision rights leads to more 
inconsistent pricing and greater conflict as managers attempt to influence pricing decisions” (p. 180). 
Further aspects of formalization pertain to systematic price planning and execution by means of 
pricing plans (Lancioni, 2005) and pricing routines (Ingenbleek, 2007; Zbaracki & Bergen, 2010).  
Two empirical studies have analyzed the effect of formalization in pricing in which 
investigators found a positive effect of formalization in terms of standardized behavior, procedures, 
and rules (Argouslidis & Indounas, 2010; Tzokas et al., 2000). Like these researchers, we define 
formalization as the extent to which formal rules and standard procedures govern the pricing process. 
However, we focus on formalization of the most important pricing decisions, which include setting 
and managing list and target prices, establishing pricing architectures, managing special price requests, 
and gathering competitive and market price intelligence (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010b). 
Centralization. Centralization generally measures the extent to which decision-making 
authority is concentrated at higher levels of the SBU’s hierarchy (Zelfane, 1989; Dastmalchian & 
Boag, 1990; Olson, Slater & Hult, 2005; Vorhies & Morgan, 2003). Prior research has examined 
centralization of specific marketing processes (Cadogan et al., 2005; Homburg, Workman & Jensen, 
2002; Menon, Jaworski & Kohli, 1997; Workman, Homburg & Jensen, 2003).  
Investigators have studied centralization in pricing in three contexts, with most research 
focusing on the question of how much pricing authority should be granted to the sales force 
(Bhardwaj, 2001; Frenzen et al., 2010; Kissan, 2001; Mishra & Prasad, 2004; Mishra, 2005). This line 
of research has an exclusive focus on transactional pricing activities. A second stream of research 
primarily examines the question of the degree to which pricing authority should be delegated to local 
entities (Cavusgil, Kwong Chan & Chun Zhang, 2003; Myers, 1997; Picard, Boddewyn & Grosse, 
1998; Samiee, 1987). Research in this area extends beyond transactional pricing to include strategic 
aspects like price positioning.  
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The activity-based literature of pricing proposes the most general understanding of 
centralization, discussing it as a characteristic of the overall organizational decision process (Nagle, 
Hogan & Zale, 2011; Smith, 1995). This understanding best fits our view. Drawing on prior research 
on activity-based pricing, we define centralization as the extent to which the most important decisions 
are made at the higher levels of the organization. Thus, our understanding of centralization is not 
limited to transactional pricing but encompasses all critical pricing decisions. 
Specialization. The organization literature generally refers to specialization as the extent to 
which full-time employees deal exclusively with various specialized activities (Bryman et al., 1983; 
Dastmalchian & Boag, 1990; Postrel, 2002). Specialized roles have emerged in several areas of value 
creation and appropriation, e.g. key account managers (Homburg, Workman & Jensen, 2002; 
Workman, Homburg & Jensen, 2003) and product managers (Low & Fullerton, 1994; Shoker, 
Srivastava & Ruekert, 1994). However, specialized roles with respect to pricing are rather new 
(Calogridis, 2006; Carricano, Trinquecoste & Mondejar, 2010). They are often established in the 
course of change management initiatives (Aeppel, 2007; Carricano, Trinquecoste & Mondejar, 2010). 
Specialization in pricing occurs at different hierarchical levels and to varying degrees. At lower 
hierarchical levels, pricing analysts prepare pricing decisions by, for example, collecting relevant data 
(Carricano, Trinquecoste & Mondejar, 2010; Dutta, Zbaracki & Bergen, 2003; Zbaracki & Bergen, 
2010). Pricing managers or pricing directors represent another specialization (Carricano, Trinquecoste 
& Mondejar, 2010; Morris & Calantone, 1990).  
In addition to manifesting in single jobs, specialization can take other forms involving several 
managers. In one approach, multiple functional areas assume responsibility for pricing through pricing 
committees (Capon, Farley & Hulbert, 1975; Lancioni, 2005). In an opposite approach, a fully 
responsible pricing unit takes on specialization tasks (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010b; Homburg, 
Workman & Jensen, 2000, p. 466; Nagle, Hogan & Zale, 2011). The diverse ways of implementing 
specialized pricing functions reflect the variation in the extent of specialization within firms. 
Specialization occurs at two extremes: “At the [one] extreme we hear the statement: ‘Pricing is 
everybody’s job’; and at the other end is the declaration: ‘We have a special pricing group and only 
they have to worry about pricing’ ” (Shapiro, 1983, p. 32). We build on the concept of specialization 
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as exhibiting differing degrees rather than being binary (Olson, Slater & Hult, 2005; Vorhies & 
Morgan, 2003). As a result, we define specialization as the extent to which employees are exclusively 
dedicated to pricing activities. 
Dispersion of influence. Dispersion of influence is a typical phenomenon of cross-functional 
decision processes and a nonstructural dimension of value creation and appropriation organization 
(Homburg, Workman & Jensen, 2000; Workman, Homburg & Gruner, 1998). Dispersion is concerned 
with the distribution of power among different functional groups (Krohmer, Homburg & Workman, 
2002; Troilo, de Luca & Guenzi, 2009). More precisely, it is “the degree of coherence with an 
identical influence distribution across all the functional groups” (Krohmer, Homburg & Workman, 
2002, p. 454).  
Dispersion of influence is also a critical dimension of pricing organization. Conceptually, 
pricing is a ‘spanning capability’ (Day, 1994), and as a consequence, pricing must integrate inside-out 
and outside-in capabilities. This integration involves a certain level of cross-functional interaction as 
organizations tend to develop capabilities in different functional areas (Homburg & Jensen, 2007; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Empirical evidence confirms the presence of a high degree of cross-
functional decision-making in pricing, as several studies show that pricing is one of the activities 
where influence is most dispersed (Homburg, Workman & Krohmer, 1999; Krohmer, Homburg & 
Workman, 2002; Lancioni, Schau & Smith, 2005; Troilo, de Luca & Guenzi, 2009; Verhoef & 
Leeflang, 2009). While sales, marketing, and controlling are the most influential departments in 
pricing, the distribution of influence varies across companies (Krohmer, Homburg & Workman, 
2002). 
No empirical study to date has focused on dispersion of influence as a dimension of pricing 
organization. However, studies that consider dispersion in the context of market-directed activities 
show that it improves collaboration at the marketing–sales interface (Troilo, de Luca & Guenzi, 2009) 
and seems to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and adaptability on the firm level (Krohmer, Homburg 
& Workman, 2002). Drawing on this line of research, we define dispersion of influence as the extent 
to which sales, marketing, and controlling influence pricing decisions equally. As decision influence 
might vary across activities relating to pricing (Troilo, de Luca & Guenzi, 2009), we distinguish 
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dispersion of influence for four decision areas: strategic decisions, list or target price decisions, 
transactional pricing decisions, and price controlling (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010b; Dutta, Zbaracki 
& Bergen, 2003; Farley, Hulbert & Weinstein, 1980; Hinterhuber, 2004; Lancioni, 2005; Shipley & 
Jobber, 2001). 
Top-management involvement. The role of top management for the efficiency and 
effectiveness of various activities has been studied several times (Antioco et al., 2008; Cadogan et al., 
2005; Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Le Meunier-FitzHugh & Piercy, 2009; Menon, Jaworski & Kohli, 
1997; Song, Xie & Dyer, 2000). The importance of top management is attributed to normative 
influences on employees’ behaviors as well as the ability to provide clear objectives and appropriate 
organizational structures (Cadogan et al., 2005; Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Song, Xie & Dyer, 2000). As 
the pricing literature shows, top-management involvement is a unique organizational feature and is 
regarded as crucial to the development of professional pricing skills (Hinterhuber, 2008; Ingenbleek et 
al., 2003). In fact, “[g]etting top management attention seems to be one of the critical drivers of a 
genuine value orientation” (Carricano et al., 2010, p. 472). However, “managers tend give a larger 
weight to value creation variables than to pricing” (Ingenbleek, 2007, p. 451)—a remarkable finding 
given that research has shown that companies focusing on value extraction (such as pricing) tend to be 
more successful (Mizik & Jacobson, 2003). 
Some evidence indicates that top-management involvement might foster an organization-wide 
pricing culture, especially as the term ‘culture’ has been linked to pricing in several publications 
(Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010b; Lancioni, 2005; Lancioni, Schau & Smith, 2005). In the corporate 
culture literature, culture often refers to a set of shared values and beliefs initiated by a top-down 
process (Deshpande & Webster, 1989). In a similar vein, the pricing literature ascribes internal 
resistance to pricing decisions to “management cultures that do not place a high priority on pricing 
and regard the price setting as a ‘seat of the pants’ quick response decision” (Lancioni, Schau & 
Smith, 2005, p. 130). We therefore define top-management involvement as the extent to which top 
executives view pricing as a core activity and support its continuous improvement.  
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3.2. Outcome variables 
In addition to organizational dimensions we study how pricing organization configurations relate to 
outcome variables. We distinguish between outcomes with respect to pricing organization, and 
outcomes on the level of the overall firm. 
First, we examine pricing process effectiveness, pricing process efficiency, and adaptability of 
pricing as outcome variables directly linked to pricing organization. These aspects cover several facets 
of organizational outcomes often discussed in the literature. We define pricing process effectiveness as 
the extent to which a company succeeds in capturing a high share of the value it creates (Dutta, 
Zbaracki & Bergen, 2003). Pricing process efficiency takes into account the “relationship between 
organizational outputs and the inputs required to reach those outputs” (Ruekert, Walker & Roering, 
1985, p. 15). As pricing decisions can consume considerable internal managerial effort and costs 
(Zbaracki et al., 2004), we define pricing process efficiency as the extent to which the pricing process 
is productive considering the internal efforts. Adaptability of pricing is the extent to which the pricing 
organization allows flexible reaction to changes in the marketplace (Ruekert, Walker & Roering, 
1985).  
A fourth outcome variable, quality of cooperation, is a frequently used behavioral variable in 
the organizational interface literature and refers to the extent to which actors involved in pricing 
collaborate through combined efforts (Homburg & Jensen, 2007; Homburg, Jensen & Krohmer, 
2008). Pricing decisions affect an intra-organizational political system consisting of several 
departments (Lancioni, Schau & Smith, 2005). As a result, pricing decisions are prone to intra-
organizational conflicts and competing interests (Capon & Hulbert, 1975; Farley, Hulbert & 
Weinstein, 1980; Myers, 1997; Smith, 1995; Zbaracki & Bergen, 2010), which make achieving a 
unified effort a thorny undertaking. 
Secondly, we include subjective outcome measures on the SBU-level. Strong conceptual 
evidence indicates that pricing affects overall firm performance (Dolan & Simon, 1997; Dutta, 
Zbaracki & Bergen, 2003; Hinterhuber, 2004). Pricing objectives are usually derived from goals 
relating to the overall business strategy (Oxenfeldt, 1973). In line with current thinking in the pricing 
literature about trade-offs between profit-oriented and market-oriented objectives (Simon, Bilstein & 
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Luby, 2006), we distinguish market performance from financial performance (Day & Fahey, 1988; 
Morgan, Clark & Gooner, 2002). 
Thirdly, we study objective performance measures on the SBU-level, particularly return-on-
sales (ROS; i.e. operating profit divided by operating revenues) (Homburg, Jensen & Krohmer, 2008). 
3.3. Control variables 
When we investigate whether configurations of pricing organization differ in terms of outcomes, we 
control for two internal and one external contextual variables. First, we consider SBU-size as one of 
the most frequently used control variables of organization research (Homburg, Workman & Krohmer, 
1999; Troilo, de Luca & Guenzi, 2009; Verhoef & Leeflang, 2009). SBU size has also been shown to 
affect strategic pricing decisions (Diamantopoulos & Mathews, 1994; Jobber & Hooley, 1987). 
Secondly, we control for the extent to which firms adopt a differentiation strategy. The pricing 
literature repeatedly discusses differentiated offerings as a source of pricing advantage (Hinterhuber, 
2004; Monroe, 2005; Nagle, Hogan & Zale, 2011). Strategy in general is a frequently studied variable 
in organization research (Olson, Slater & Hult, 2005; Vorhies & Morgan, 2003). Thirdly, as 
competitive intensity has been shown to affect both organizational outcomes (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993) 
and pricing decisions (Forman & Lancioni, 2002; Ingenbleek et al., 2003), we control for it as an 
important external factor. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Data collection procedure 
To conduct an exploratory survey, we obtained information from a commercial address provider about 
executives from 3,247 firms in six different B2B industry sectors (see Table 1). We sent all executives 
personalized e-mails and a follow-up reminder to motivate participation in the study. Promising strict 
confidentiality, we asked respondents to refer to their SBU or, if their company had only one SBU, to 
their company. 
----------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 
----------------------- 
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In total, we obtained 470 questionnaires, of which 51 could not be used because of missing 
data. When assessing the response rate, we took into account the sensitivity of the pricing topic and its 
inherent confidentiality concerns. Quantitative empirical studies on pricing have shown response rates 
of around 13% (Forman & Hunt, 2005; Ingenbleek et al., 2003), placing our response rate of 12.9% 
within the range of comparable research. We tested for a potential nonresponse bias by comparing 
construct means for early and late respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). The fact that we did not 
find significant differences between early and late respondents (p< .05) speaks against any strong 
nonresponse bias.  
To address the common method bias issue resulting from relying on a single respondent per 
company (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Podsakoff et al., 2012), we collected objective financial performance 
data from annual reports and the firms’ websites. For almost half of the companies, we obtained the 
ROS for the last three years. In addition, we managed to obtain objective data regarding the pricing 
organization variable of specialization. We defined specialization as the extent to which companies 
have employees that are exclusively dedicated to pricing activities, thus we expect firms with a high 
degree of specialization to have dedicated pricing jobs. We used job descriptions as an objective 
validation of specialization. To test whether responding firms make use of specialized pricing 
positions such as pricing managers, pricing analysts, or pricing directors, we used information from a 
social network of professionals as well as our respondents’ position. This approach has limitations, 
however, as it proves the existence of titled pricing jobs but fails to encompass pricing positions for 
which the job title does not reflect the specialization. Moreover, not all pricing specialists are enrolled 
in professionals’ social networks, internal job titles may differ from our search terms, and cross-
functional appearances of specialization such as dedicated pricing committees would be undetectable. 
Despite these limitations, we believe that our approach provides valid and useful additional objective 
proxies. 
Our data collection procedures yielded objective financial data for 165 cases. Owing to 
publicity restrictions in Europe, we could not obtain financial data for all companies (Homburg, 
Jensen & Krohmer, 2008). On the basis of the objective performance data, we tested for an availability 
bias by comparing construct means for data sets with and without objective financial performance data 
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(Homburg, Jensen & Krohmer, 2008). We did not find any significant differences (p< .05) in variables 
describing the pricing organization or in outcome variables. Thus, this test speaks against the existence 
of a major availability bias, and we conclude that the companies for which we have hard financial 
performance data are not different from others in the sample.  
As we found a strong relationship between the existence of pricing jobs and the value of our 
specialization construct, we were also able to externally validate the organizational dimension of 
specialization. Within the top fifty firms showing the highest extent of specialization, we identified 
explicit pricing jobs for sixteen firms (32.0%). The remaining 369 firms with lower specialization 
scores accounted for only six additional pricing specialists. In addition, mean values of the 
specialization construct show a fundamental difference between the twenty-two companies with 
objectively validated pricing specialists and the rest of the sample (5.6 vs. 2.7). Our sample size for 
companies with a second objective source of data for latent variables is comparable to prior research 
(Homburg, Droll & Totzek, 2008). Owing to the small sample size of fewer than 30 validated pricing 
specialists, we use the nonparametric Mann–Whitney U test to evaluate the significance of the 
differences between the group of companies with objectively validated pricing specialists and the rest 
of the sample. The resulting z-scores are highly significant (z = -6.67, p = 0.000). Thus, the 
specialization value of companies with objectively validated pricing experts is significantly higher. 
This finding underscores the validity of our pricing organization constructs. 
4.2. Measurement procedure 
Consistent with their operationalization in prior research (Verhoef & Leeflang, 2009; Vorhies & 
Morgan, 2003), the constructs used in this study (except dispersion of influence) are reflective in 
nature. That is, causality goes from the unobservable variable to the single items (Bollen & Lennox, 
1991; Jarvis et al., 2003). We developed the questionnaire based on an extensive literature review and 
sense-checked it via qualitative interviews with both academics and experienced pricing specialists. In 
a second step, we pre-tested the draft version of the questionnaire with pricing experts, which led to 
minor changes in the wording of some questions. The appendix contains all questions used as well as 
references indicating their source. We assessed reliability and validity of the reflective measures with 
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an exploratory factor analysis in SPSS 12.0 and confirmatory factor analyses in Mplus 6.1. Table 2 
shows the results. 
----------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 
----------------------- 
Confirmatory factor analysis is a powerful complement to exploratory factor analysis because 
it offers additional fit indices to assess the quality of constructs used (Bagozzi, Youjae Yi & Phillips, 
1991). For the assessment of the constructs, we used composite reliability, indicator reliability of each 
item, and average variance extracted (AVE). To examine the quality of the constructs, we relied on 
²/df, RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation), TLI (Tucker-Lewis Index), CFI 
(comparative fit index), and SRMR (standardized root mean square residual). Overall, the obtained fit 
indices suggest a high quality of our measurement instruments. AVE values as well as correlations 
between all constructs are provided in table 3. 
Comparing the AVE from each construct with the squared correlations between all pairs of 
constructs allowed us to conclude that high levels of discriminatory validity exist (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981, cf. table 4). Table 5 presents all fit indices. Consistent with prior research, we measured 
dispersion of influence by assessing the influence of sales, marketing, and finance over four pricing 
areas (activities) by using a 100-point constant-sum scale. We computed a single index reflecting the 
extent to which dispersion of influence occurs (Krohmer, Homburg & Workman, 2002; Troilo, de 
Luca & Guenzi, 2009). High index values indicate high levels of dispersion. We further used a single 
question for objective financial performance (return on sales). 
--------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES 3, 4 & 5 
--------------------------------- 
4.3. Exploratory configurational analysis: taxonomic procedure 
We use the different dimensions of pricing organization to identify an empirical taxonomy of 
configurations. We employ latent class analysis in Mplus 6.1 (Muthen & Muthen, 2007), because of 
its methodological strengths (Magidson & Vermunt, 2002; Nylund, Asparoutiov & Muthen, 2007). In 
particular, probabilistic cluster algorithms can better reflect the ambiguity in cluster assignments than 
traditional approaches. Hence, latent class analysis overcomes concerns that clusters “might be 
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understood best by thinking of them as hybrids or combinations of the ‘pure’ types” (Cannon & 
Perreault, 1999, p. 458).  
Consistent with previous research, we opted for a three-stage clustering approach to address 
three main issues: determining the number of clusters, assessing the stability of cluster assignments, 
and assigning observations to clusters (Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Homburg, Jensen & Krohmer, 
2008; Homburg, Workman & Jensen, 2002). Building on Nylund et al. (2007), we used three criteria 
to determine the number of clusters: Bayes’ Information Criterion (BIC), Lamda-Mu-Rho (LMR) p 
values, and the Bootstrap Likelihood Ratio Test (BLRT). BIC and LMR were used to reduce the 
number of possible solutions. Because of the increased amount of computing time, BLRT served as a 
validator for the most likely solution. In the interest of rigor, we probed for all possible solutions (1–8 
clusters). We found strong support for a five-cluster solution. First, the minimum BIC statistic is 
clearly associated with the five-cluster model. Second, the LMR p value of this model shows a good 
relative fit, as does the BLRT. Following a procedure used in comparable taxonomy research, we 
additionally clustered ten randomly selected subsamples from our data, each containing two-thirds of 
the sample (Homburg, Jensen & Krohmer, 2008; Homburg, Workman & Jensen, 2002). The five-
cluster solution was confirmed as the BIC measure was lowest for five clusters in most of the 
subsamples. 
To assess the stability of the cluster assignment, we conducted a number of tests. First, we 
increased the number of random starts of the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm and tightened 
the convergence value (McLachlan & Peel 2000). None of the solutions revealed an improved value of 
the log-likelihood function, providing evidence for a global optimum. Secondly, we assessed the 
average latent class probability for the most likely class membership in each cluster. Four of the five 
clusters revealed an average of well above 85%. We consider this result to be further evidence for 
distinctive and stable cluster assignments. Third, we used a split sample approach to verify stability 
(Homburg, Workman, & Jensen, 2002). Results showed that most of the observations in the 
overlapping sample had been assigned to the same cluster. Fourth, we compared our cluster means 
with those of a deterministic cluster analysis based on a hybrid clustering approach (Cannon & 
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Perreault, 1999; Homburg, Jensen & Krohmer, 2008). The most remarkable difference was cluster 
size. In terms of the interpretation of clusters, both methods led to very similar results. 
Finally, we assigned the observations to clusters by computing a five-cluster solution for the 
complete sample using a high number of random starts and a high convergence value. Even though the 
EM algorithm calculates probabilities of class membership, every observation is eventually assigned 
to a single cluster. The non-overlapping assignment was the basis for our further analyses. 
 
5. RESULTS 
A central step towards a taxonomy is to validate whether the clusters have meaningful interpretations 
(Rich, 1992). Table 6 shows the cluster means for each of the five cluster variables (for a verbalization 
see appendix 2). Following the interpretation steps suggested in previous research (Homburg, Jensen 
& Krohmer, 2008), we first compared the clusters on the basis of Duncan's multiple-range test and 
then transferred the resulting bands into verbal descriptions of a configuration with respect to the 
cluster variables. 
------------------ 
Insert Table 6 
------------------ 
5.1. Interpretation of configurations (clusters) 
In accordance with previous cluster analysis work, we assigned names to the different configurations 
to reflect an interpretation of each cluster. The names are intended to catch the most distinctive aspects 
of the different approaches to pricing organization. We introduce the prototypes by cluster size, from 
largest to smallest.  
Rock-Solid Handcrafter. This cluster was the most commonly used approach (47.3% of the 
cases in the sample). Its firms have a well-defined organization that underpins critical pricing 
processes and have made investments in a systematic pricing infrastructure. As a result, centralization 
and formalization as well as top-management involvement are high (5.6, 6.0, and 6.0). These 
characteristics imply that upper management levels are involved in important pricing decisions and 
that the pricing process takes place in a rather formalized environment. Top management regards 
pricing as a critical capability, which ensures the necessary attention. A top-down driven pricing 
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culture is likely to have emerged. A remarkable feature of the Rock-Solid Handcrafter is, however, the 
very limited use of dedicated pricing specialists. Pricing seems to be managed in a purely activity-
based way. Pricing is not implemented as a separate function in the organizational structure, and the 
dispersion of influence is rather low (51.5). Firms in the Rock-Solid Handcrafter tend to make price 
decisions in a dominant department, which is usually the sales department. 
Eager Beaver. While the Eager Beaver approach to pricing is also widely used (19.6% of 
cases), it is less common than the previous cluster. Although the Eager Beaver differs little from the 
Rock Solid Handcrafter as far as centralization, formalization, and top-management involvement are 
concerned, it diverges strongly in the organizational dimensions of specialization and dispersion of 
influence (5.2 vs. 2.2, and 57.2 vs. 51.5). In contrast to the Rock Solid Handcrafter, the Eager Beaver 
firm implements pricing as a dedicated function. As a result, specialization scores top values. 
Moreover, firms in the Eager Beaver cluster allow a greater dispersion of influence across sales, 
marketing, and finance/accounting leading to a system of checks-and-balances across several 
departments. The fact that specialization does not lead to concentrated decision influence may seem 
initially surprising. However, the wide dispersion of influence suggests that specialized pricing 
functions assume a coordination and integration role. 
Monocracy. This approach to price organization (12.9% of all cases) is less systematic than 
the two previous clusters. While centralization is strong, limited formalization and hardly any 
specialization occur in Monocracy firms (4.0 and 1.8). The nonstructural dimensions of top-
management involvement and dispersion of influence are also less developed (3.4 and 53.3). These 
characteristics indicate that no systematic pricing organization has been set up, and usually a dominant 
personality located in higher management levels makes the important pricing decisions. Most likely, 
this manager is situated either on the management board or in sales management. While the 
Monocracy firm has the ability to make decisive pricing decisions, concerns may exist about its ability 
to consolidate and integrate relevant internal and external perspectives. Ad-hoc decisions by a 
dominant manager are likely, and as a result, decisions are less efficient and effective.  
Talk the Talk. This smaller cluster of firms (11.9%) also takes a less systematic approach to 
pricing organization although they have relatively high top-management involvement. Companies in 
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this cluster tend to neglect implementing important aspects of pricing, that is, formalization and 
specialization are low (3.2 and 1.7). The difference between Talk the Talk and Monocracy firms is the 
low degree of centralization (1.7) in Talk the Talk firms. This suggests a certain neglect of the actual 
pricing organization, with little structure and a laissez-faire attitude on the part of the firm. Thus, a 
systematic pricing approach is invoked as the “flavor of the month” (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010b, 
p. 284), although it is not implemented in daily practice. These firms describe price management as 
being very important and top-management driven, but ultimately the involvement of senior executives 
to developing a more professional and systematic pricing organization is limited (5.8).  
Stuck in the Middle. This cluster (8.4%) shows ambiguous results for most of the dimensions. 
While formalization and specialization as well as dispersion of influence are toward the higher end of 
scale values (4.5, 4.3, and 59.0), they are still considerably below the top performers. At the same 
time, low centralization and rather low top-management involvement prevail (4.8 and 4.6). 
Organizational structure seems to evolve without the involvement and support of top management, 
and the development of pricing organization is driven bottom-up. This approach endangers the 
potentially positive effects of formal processes and specialization as they may face acceptance issues 
in the organization. When top-down support is lacking, pricing initiatives may not be fully 
implemented. Holders of specialist positions may become ‘gray eminences,’ whose expertise is always 
appreciated but whose opinion is not considered in decision making. 
5.2. Outcome implications of configurations 
The description of clusters reveals diverse configurations of pricing organization. To test the 
performance implications of the different configurations, we analyzed three distinct types of outcome 
variables. First, we included perceptual pricing-specific outcomes, as well as a behavioral variable, i.e. 
quality of cooperation. Secondly, we analyzed effects on firm performance, specifically relative 
financial and market performance. We acknowledge that unlike pricing-specific outcomes, firm 
performance differences are influenced by variables other than price organization. Finally, we use 
objective firm profitability data. 
The results show that the Eager Beaver and the Rock-Solid Handcrafter configurations 
consistently achieve superior performance in all outcome variables, with the Eager Beaver slightly 
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outperforming the Rock-Solid Handcrafter (maximum difference between performance outcomes = 
0.2). The three remaining approaches (Stuck in the Middle, Talk the Talk, and Monocracy) are less 
successful. Objective ROS data confirm the existence of two groups of clusters with differing 
performances (2.9% vs. 0.8%). A few notable exceptions emerge. We find a relatively high level of 
market performance for Stuck in the Middle configurations (4.7). This result reflects the ambiguous 
character of this cluster. The fact that Monocracy reaches a reasonable degree of process effectiveness 
(4.2) may be less surprising, given the assumed ad-hoc decision-making by a single person. However, 
in terms of relative financial performance it achieves the poorest level (4.3) of all clusters. 
The overall result shows that investments in a systematic pricing organization pay off, 
confirming that companies should “deliberately build a strong pricing infrastructure that underpins 
and sustains pricing excellence” (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010a, p. 2). The most successful 
configurations (Eager Beaver and Rock-Solid Handcrafter) have a well-defined pricing organization, 
and firms in both clusters make intensive use of formalized procedures and centralize the most critical 
pricing processes. In addition, management cultivates a pricing culture across the organization by 
extensive top-management involvement to pricing. Less successful organizations fail in the three 
dimensions of formalization, centralization, and top-management involvement. When embedded in 
these three dimensions, specialization and horizontal delegation of price authority seem to be a way to 
enhance performance. However, less successful clusters show that specialization and dispersion of 
influence might be tricky, with ambiguous isolated effects. Remarkably, Talk the Talk shows the 
lowest performance in terms of all outcome dimensions. “Believing it is enough for the CEO to assert 
that pricing is a priority“ has been assumed to be a common pitfall (Baker, Marn & Zawada 2010a, p. 
284), and the low performance of the Talk the Talk cluster seems to underscore this statement. 
For further rigor we tested for omitted variable bias by including strategic orientation, SBU-
size, and competitive intensity as control variables in the analysis. Similar to previous research (e.g. 
Homburg, Workman & Jensen, 2002), we used an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to test for 
performance differences. Appendix 3 shows that although control variables have significant effects on 
most outcome variables, the effects of cluster memberships are still significant. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
6.1. Theoretical implications 
Although prior research has not empirically established different pricing organization configurations, 
we juxtapose our findings to previous discussions on the options companies have for organizing 
pricing. We identified three relevant studies describing typologies of pricing organization. One of 
them analyzes the overall pricing organization (Smith, 1995), whereas two mainly, but not 
exclusively, focus on a specialized pricing function (Baker, Marn & Zawada, 2010b; Carricano, 
Trinquecoste & Mondejar, 2010).  
Smith (1995) suggests four clusters of pricing orientation: cost-oriented, sales-oriented, 
competitor-oriented, and strategy-oriented. From our empirical results we cannot confirm that the 
most fundamental difference between configurations is the horizontal delegation of pricing authority 
as implied by Smith’s (1995) taxonomy. Instead, we observe a high dispersion of influence among 
departments, with sales playing a crucial role. This observation is consistent with prior research 
(Homburg, Workman & Krohmer, 1999; Krohmer, Homburg & Workman, 2002; Lancioni, Schau & 
Smith, 2005; Troilo, de Luca & Guenzi, 2009; Verhoef & Leeflang, 2009). In addition, we cannot 
confirm decentralized types with little interdepartmental interaction. Instead, our results show that 
decentralized clusters tend to delegate authority vertically to several departments, which leads to a 
higher dispersion of influence.  
However, we find similarities with Smith’s (1995) clusters in some of the configurations. 
Most outstanding is the similarity of the strategy-oriented cluster and the Eager Beaver. The strategy-
oriented type is characterized by integrated decision processes, formalized and centralized processes, 
and low inter-functional conflict. This profile reflects typical features of the Eager Beaver. Further 
similarities regarding centralization, formalization, dispersion of influence, and quality of cooperation 
appear between the Monocracy firm and the cost-oriented type. 
Other quantitative research suggests three degrees of maturity of the pricing function: 
commodity, control, and value (Carricano et al., 2010), although the results are not immediately 
comparable with our study as the research is based on interviews with holders of specialized pricing 
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functions, which our study shows to be rather infrequent. A bias exists toward companies that have 
already specialized the pricing function to some extent. However, some interesting similarities exist, 
as two of our configurations have a higher degree of specialization. More specifically, the 
benchmarking clusters of Value and Control are similar to our Eager Beaver cluster. In Carricano et al. 
(2010) study’s Commodity cluster, price management is regarded as an impossible dream. A 
systematic price management process is non-existent or inefficient. This description parallels typical 
features of Stuck in the Middle configurations. 
Baker et al. (2010b) distinguishes two clusters of specialized pricing organizations: active and 
passive. A main difference between active and passive is the level of top management support, with 
much greater support present in the active pricing organization. In a similar vein, we find that while 
the clusters Eager Beaver and Stuck in the Middle both have specialized pricing functions, only the 
Eager Beaver enjoys explicit top-management involvement. However, the different performance 
outcomes of both clusters are consistent with the assumptions made by Baker et al. (2010b).  
Comparing our findings to earlier proposed conceptual typologies reveals that our work 
contributes significantly to knowledge in this area. This comparison concerns not only the dimensions 
examined but also the number and type of identified clusters. While we found similarities to other 
proposed typologies, we could not empirically corroborate them. Our results emphasize the relevance 
for theory and practice of empirically validating and complementing such conceptual typologies. 
6.2. Implications for academic research 
Despite the relevance of pricing organization for achieving profitability, the topic has long been 
neglected in empirical research, and conceptual and anecdotal evidence is fragmented and largely 
subjective in nature. We contribute to the literature with both our conceptualization of pricing 
organization and our empirically derived taxonomy. To the best of our knowledge, our research is the 
first to explore organizational issues of pricing on the basis of a large empirical database allowing for 
generalizability among similar industry contexts. In addition, this study provides conceptual clarity to 
the dimensions of pricing organization.  
 We propose a framework consisting of structural and nonstructural organizational dimensions. 
More specifically, we consider formalization, centralization, and specialization as structural 
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dimensions, and dispersion of influence and top-management involvement as nonstructural 
dimensions of pricing organization. Structural dimensions have been studied extensively in other 
contexts but have never been comprehensively explored in the pricing field. Nonstructural dimensions 
have been less explored in general, and in pricing research, empirical evidence of nonstructural 
dimensions is nonexistent. Our multidimensional conceptualization may be helpful not only for 
studying pricing organization itself but also for exploring potential contingencies between 
organization and pricing practices (Ingenbleek, 2007).  
As a pioneering research approach to pricing organization, this article is the first to empirically 
classify pricing organization designs as configurations. Our findings challenge ad hoc conceptual and 
anecdotal classifications in previous studies that had not been empirically validated. While our results 
confirm several previous statements on the relevance of the dimensions, they lead to rejection of 
others. For example, we did not find pricing power to be concentrated in sales, marketing, or 
controlling. Rather, we identified that influence is usually spread across all departments and that 
dispersion of influence rather than concentration matters. An important contribution of our research is 
to address the link between intra-organizational pricing issues and performance. With a few 
exceptions (Frenzen et al., 2010; Ingenbleek et al., 2003), empirical pricing research has not 
considered performance implications. Our research considers not only perceptual pricing-specific 
performance measures but also outcome variables on the organizational level as well as objective 
performance data, and the significantly superior results of systematically-organized clusters confirm 
the importance of pricing organization and of pricing in general. Our multidimensional assessment of 
performance provides a helpful basis for further empirical research in pricing.  
Finally, we used a probabilistic cluster analysis to derive our taxonomy. This represents an 
advanced approach to cluster analysis (Magidson & Vermunt, 2002). Probabilistic cluster analysis is 
particularly well suited to reflect the hybrid nature of clusters. This is important because pure types of 
clusters are rarely found in practice (Cannon & Perreault, 1999).  
6.3. Implications for managerial practice 
When introducing sophisticated pricing methods, tools, and systems, managers should not overlook 
the importance of the organizational backbone of pricing. Our research confirms that successful 
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pricing requires a systematic design of the pricing organization. Setting up organizational structures 
and initiating organizational change are usually top-down decisions made by top executives. In 
addition, given the profit impact of pricing, managerial insights into how pricing can be improved are 
highly relevant.  
Our research has two main managerial implications. First, our conceptualization offers 
managers a structured guideline for evaluating pricing organization and price management in their 
companies. In making this evaluation, managers should discuss the following questions with 
colleagues involved in the pricing organization: How formalized are their pricing processes? Are the 
most important pricing decisions made at higher or lower hierarchical levels? To which extend do 
they use specialized roles and functions in their pricing? Do multiple decision makers participate, and 
does a system of checks and balances exist between departments? Are pricing and value appropriation 
assumed to be a strategic priority in the pricing organization? Working through these questions 
allows managers to discover neglected areas and to motivate the need for action in those areas.  
Second, our results show that a laissez-faire approach is not an option in pricing organization. 
The most successful pricing organizations unanimously show a higher degree of formalization, 
centralization, and top-management involvement. Specialization and dispersion of influence can be 
used as additional (or peripheral) levers to further enhance performance. As the Talk the Talk cluster 
shows, merely asserting that pricing is a priority is inadequate. Managers can make a difference only if 
their ‘strategic talk’ is followed by an ‘operational walk’. In addition, a half-way approach to pricing 
organization excellence proved to be far less successful than fully developed organizational forms. 
Thus, the development of pricing organization is a task that needs to be systematically completed 
before superior results can be achieved. Overall, based on our findings, pricing organization appears to 
be a highly relevant issue for managerial value appropriation practice. Our study indicates clear 
variety of different organizational pricing configurations, which are visible in practice. 
6.4. Limitations and avenues for further research 
In using a large-scale sample to systematically explore pricing organization, we made several choices 
that might limit the interpretation of the results. Further research should assess the effect of the 
environment on dimensions of pricing organization, as the literature has assumed that the pricing 
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organization might depend on environmental factors (Nagle, Hogan & Zale, 2011). Potential 
influencing factors could be drawn from research on pricing objectives and pricing strategies 
(Diamantopoulos & Mathews, 1994; Jobber & Hooley, 1987). Second, further research should assess 
whether the type of pricing organization influences the adoption of certain pricing practices. The 
literature has hypothesized a contingency relationship between organizational set-up and value-
informed pricing (Ingenbleek, 2007). Third, our study uses key informant data, an approach 
commonly employed in empirical marketing research (Homburg, Jensen & Krohmer, 2008; Verhoef 
& Leeflang, 2009). Future research should collect data from multiple respondents. Fourth, we 
collected our data in a European country. As the societal context might influence marketing 
organization (Homburg, Workman & Krohmer, 1999), future research should verify whether the same 
configurations appear in Asian or U.S.-based companies. Fifth, ideally the effects on performance 
would be analyzed in a longitudinal research design to better assess causality. Understanding the 
dynamics of pricing organization would be an important influence in changing management 
initiatives. 
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Table 1: Sample composition 
 
Industry Position of respondent Number of employees in 
SBU/company (in m€) 
Machinery 29.8% General manager/director 59.5% < 15 5.0% 
Fabricated Metal Products 17.0% Head of Sales 20.5% 16-30 14.9% 
Electronics 16.8% Head of Marketing 16.0% 31 – 60 26.7% 
Measurement, Control, 
Medical 
 
16.3% 
Pricing Manager 4.0% 61 – 100 18.5% 
Chemicals 11.0%   101 – 300 20.7% 
Rubber and Plastics 9.0%   301 – 600 6.2% 
    601 – 1500 5.1% 
    > 1500 2.9% 
 
 
 
  
Table(s)
2 
 
Table 2: Results of confirmatory factor analyses 
Constructs No. 
of  
items 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Indicator 
reliabilities 
Composite  
reliability 
²/df AVE RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR 
Formalization 4 0.83 0.45-0.76 0.83 3.34 0.55 0.075 0.99 0.98 0.016 
Centralization 4 0.83 0.37-0.79 0.84 0.95 0.57 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.000 
Specialization 3 0.75 0.46-0.54 0.75 - 0.51 - - - - 
Top-
management 
involvement 
3 0.87 0.60-0.87 0.88 - 0.70 - - - - 
Pricing 
process 
effectiveness 
4 0.88 0.58-0.73 0.89 1.91 0.66 0.046 1.00 0.99 0.009 
Pricing 
process 
efficiency 
3 0.76 0.40-0.63 0.77 - 0.52 - - - - 
Pricing 
process 
adaptability 
3 0.83 0.44-0.86 0.84 - 0.63 - - - - 
Quality of 
cooperation 
4 0.92 0.70-0.79 0.92 0.34 0.75 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.003 
Financial 
performance 
3 0.95 0.80-0.94 0.95 - 0.87 - - - - 
Market 
performance 
3 0.88 0.64-0.74 0.88 - 0.70 - - - - 
Competitive 
intensity 
3 0.86 0.58-0.76 0.86 - 0.68 - - - - 
Differentiation 
strategy 
4 0.80 0.40-0.60 0.80 2.63 0.50 0.062 0.99 0.98 0.016 
           
N=419 
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Table 3: Statistical cluster description 
 
Category Variable 
 
 
 
(Cluster size) 
Stuck in 
the Middle 
 
 
(8.4%) 
Monocracy 
 
 
 
(12.9%) 
Talk the 
Talk 
 
 
(11.9% ) 
Rock-Solid 
Handcrafter 
 
 
(47.3%) 
Eager 
Beaver 
 
 
(19.6%) 
Structural 
dimensions 
Formalization 4.5 (c) 4.0 (b) 3.2 (a) 5.6 (d) 5.9 (d) 
Centralization 4.8 (a) 5.8 (c) 5.2 (b) 6.0 (c) 5.7 (c) 
Specialization 4.3 (c) 1.8 (a) 1.7 (a) 2.2 (b) 5.2 (d) 
Nonstructural 
dimensions 
Dispersion of 
influence 
59.0 (c) 53.3 (ab) 59.6 (c) 51.5 (a) 57.2 (bc) 
Top-
management 
involvement 
4.6 (b) 3.4 (a) 5.8 (c) 6.0 (c) 6.4 (d) 
Pricing-level 
outcomes 
Pricing process 
effectiveness 
4.0 (a) 4.2 (ab) 4.1 (a) 4.5 (bc) 4.6 (c) 
Pricing process 
efficiency 
4.3 (b) 3.9 (b) 3.8 (a) 4.9 (c) 5.1 (c) 
Pricing process 
adaptability 
4.1 (ab) 3.8 (a) 3.8 (a) 4.5 (bc) 4.7 (c) 
Quality of 
cooperation in 
pricing 
4.1 (a) 4.4 (a) 4.3 (a) 5.3 (b) 5.4 (b) 
Firm-level 
outcomes 
Relative 
financial 
performance 
4.5 (a) 4.3 (a) 4.5 (a) 5.0 (b) 5.0 (b) 
Relative market 
performance 
4.7 (bc) 4.7 (ab) 4.3 (a) 5.0 (bc) 5.1 (c) 
ROS* 0.8% (a) 2.9% (b) 
Notes: Reported values are mean values. In each row, cluster means that have the same letter in brackets are not 
significantly different (p< .05) on the basis of Duncan's multiple-range test. Means in the lowest band are 
assigned "a," means in the next highest band "b," and so forth. Means in the highest band are printed in bold. 
* ROS data were pooled with objective performance data on the basis of subjective outcome measures owing to 
the smaller sample size; means of the two groups were compared by a t-test, and differences were significantly 
different (p< .05)  
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Appendix: Questionnaire items 
 
 
 
 
Construct Items 
Formalization 
(adapted from Argouslidis and Indounas 2010; 
Workman, Homburg and Jensen 2003; reflective scale, 
scored on a seven-point scale with anchors 1 = “strongly 
disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 Responsibility for pricing decisions has been clearly assigned to organizational individuals in our firm. 
 Within our organization, formal internal communication channels are followed when working on pricing. 
 In our firm, the rationale for pricing decisions is well-documented and filed for future reference  
 To coordinate the parts of our organization working in pricing, standard operating procedures have been 
established. 
 In our firm, prior to submitting price quotations, we keep detailed records of the policies and methods used to 
set the prices on a standard form (document) pertaining to price decision-making.*  
Centralization 
(adapted from Cadogan et al. 2005; Frenzen et al. 2010; 
Menon, Jaworski and Kohli 1997; reflective scale, 
scored on a seven-point scale with anchors 1 = “strongly 
disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 Important pricing decisions have to be referred to someone higher up for a final answer.  
 People involved in important pricing decisions have to ask their boss before they do almost anything.  
 Employees making important pricing decisions need to have the boss's approval first.  
 Managers generally make important pricing decisions only after checking them with someone of the 
management team. 
 People are allowed flexibility in getting pricing-related work done. (R)* 
Specialization 
(adapted from Olson, Slater and Hult 2005; Vorhies and 
Morgan 2003; reflective scale, scored on a seven-point 
scale with anchors 1 = “strongly disagree” and 7 = 
“strongly agree”) 
 In our organization there are "pricing specialists" who direct their efforts to price management.  
 Pricing is everybody’s task and is performed by employees who are generalist for a wide variety of tasks. (R)* 
 Standardized training procedures exist for jobs that involve pricing activities.  
 Written position descriptions are provided to pricing specialists.  
Top Down Commitment  
(adapted from Cadogan et al. 2005; Verhoef and 
Leeflang 2009; reflective scale, scored on a seven-point 
scale with anchors 1 = “strongly disagree” and 7 = 
“strongly agree”) 
 Our top management considers efforts to improve price management to be a valuable investment of resources.
  
 Our top management considers our pricing activities as a critical success factor.  
 Our top management intends to increase the company's pricing awareness. 
 Our management formally promotes and encourages employees to deal with pricing issues. 
Pricing process effectiveness 
(based on Dutta, Zbaracki and Bergen 2003; reflective 
scale, scored on a seven-point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 We manage to enforce our anticipated prices in the market.* 
 Our customers usually pay the prices we set. 
 We manage to avoid price reductions.  
 In bargaining situations vis-á-vis customers we reach our price-related targets.  
 We successfully fight price erosion. 
Pricing process efficiency 
(adapted from Ayers, Dahlstrom and Skinner 1997; 
Krohmer, Homburg and Workman 2002; reflective 
scale, scored on a seven-point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 We achieve efficiency in all activities of the price management process  
 We perform pricing activities right the first time. 
 The amount of time and effort we spend in price management activities is worthwhile. 
 The quality of our pricing decisions justify the amount of time and effort we invest in pricing decisions.* 
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Pricing process adaptability 
(adapted from Homburg, Workman, and Jensen 2002; 
Krohmer, Homburg and Workman 2002; reflective 
scale, scored on a seven-point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 We adapt our pricing adequately to changes in the business environment of your business unit.*  
 We adapt our pricing approach quickly to the changing needs of customers. 
 We use our pricing to react quickly to new market threats. 
 We use our pricing to quickly exploit new market opportunities. 
Quality of cooperation  
(adapted from Homburg and Jensen 2007; reflective 
scale, scored on a seven-point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
In price management, the departments involved… 
 …collaborate frictionless.* 
 …act in concert. 
 …have few problems in their cooperation. 
 …achieve their common goals. 
 …trust each other. 
Financial performance 
(adapted from Krohmer, Homburg and Workman 2002; 
Vorhies and Morgan 2003; Workman, Homburg and 
Jensen 2003; reflective scale, scored on a seven-point 
scale with anchors 1 = “very poor” and 7 = “excellent”) 
 
Relative to your competitors, how has your organization performed with respect to ... 
 EBIT 
 ROS 
 ROI 
 Cash-Flow* 
Market performance  
(adapted from Krohmer, Homburg and Workman 2002; 
Vorhies and Morgan 2003; Workman, Homburg and 
Jensen 2003; reflective scale, scored on a seven-point 
scale with anchors 1 = “very poor” and 7 = “excellent”) 
Relative to your competitors, how has your organization performed with respect to ... 
 Market share* 
 Market share development 
 Revenue development 
 Attracting new customers 
Differentiation strategy  
(adapted from Homburg, Workman and Krohmer 1999; 
reflective scale, scored on a seven-point scale with 
anchors 1 = “strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly 
agree”) 
 Competitive advantage through superior products. 
 Creating superior customer value through services accompanying the products. 
 New product development. 
 Building up a premium product or brand image. 
 Obtaining high prices from the market.* 
Competitive intensity  
(adapted from Workman, Homburg, Jensen 2003; 
Jaworski and Kohli 1993; reflective scale, scored on a 
seven-point scale with anchors 1 = “strongly disagree” 
and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 Competition in our industry is cutthroat. 
 There are many "promotion wars" in our industry. 
 Anything that one competitor can offer, others can match readily. 
 Price competition is a hallmark of our industry.* 
 
* Items dropped during scale purification 
(R) Reverse-coded item 
 
 
Table 3: Pearson correlations between constructs used. 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  
AV
E 
0.55 0.51 0.57 0.70 0.66 0.52 0.63 0.75 0.87 0.70 0.50 0.68 
1 Formalization 0.55 -          
  
2 Specialization 0.51 0.269** -         
  
3 Centralization 0.57 0.201** -0.145** -        
  
4 
Top-
management 
involvement 
0.70 0.382** 0.235** 0.031 -       
  
5 
Pricing process 
effectiveness 
0.66 0.234** 0.050 0.058 0.190** -      
  
6 
Pricing process 
efficiency 
0.52 0.535** 0.187** 0.101 0.346** 0.527** -     
  
7 
Pricing process 
adaptability 
0.63 0.322** 0.135** 0.076 0.227** 0.194** 0.448** -    
  
8 
Quality of 
Cooperation 
0.75 0.493** 0.065 0.170** 0.264** 0.378** 0.606** 0.345** -   
  
9 
Financial 
Performance 
0.87 0.201** 0.79 0.050 0.219** 0.416** 0.331** 0.148** 0.211** -  
  
10 
Market 
Performance 
0.70 0.279** 0.044 0.032 0.198** 0.328** 0.379** 0.354** 0.259** 0.369** - 
  
11 
Differentiation 
Strategy 
0.50 0.224** 0.071 0.014 0.217** 0.319** 0.302** 0.163** 0.200** 0.282** 0.251** -  
12 
Competitive 
Intensity 
0.68 0.120* 0.087 0.144** 0.052 -0.211** 0.036 0.217** 0.035 -0.073 0.074 0.037 - 
*p=0.05, **p=0.01 
  
Table(s)
Table 4: Test for discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  
AV
E 
0.55 0.51 0.57 0.70 0.66 0.52 0.63 0.75 0.87 0.70 0.50 0.68 
1 Formalization 0.55 -            
2 Specialization 0.51 0.07 -           
3 Centralization 0.57 0.04 0.02 -          
4 
Top-
management 
involvement 
0.70 0.15 0.06 0.00 -         
5 
Pricing process 
effectiveness 
0.66 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 -        
6 
Pricing process 
efficiency 
0.52 0.29 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.28 -       
7 
Pricing process 
adaptability 
0.63 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.20 -      
8 
Quality of 
Cooperation 
0.75 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.37 0.12 -     
9 
Financial 
Performance 
0.87 0.04 0.62 0.00 0.05 0.17 0.11 0.02 0.04 -    
10 
Market 
Performance 
0.70 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.14 -   
11 
Differentiation 
Strategy 
0.50 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.06 -  
12 
Competitive 
Intensity 
0.68 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 - 
 
Table 5: Constructs, items, and fit indices 
 
Latent construct and survey items 
Please indicate to what extend the following statements 
characterise performance indicators available in your 
company. 
Item-to- 
Total 
correlati
on 
Indicator 
reliability  
Min Max Item 
mean 
Std. 
dev. 
       
FORMALIZATION:       
Fit indices: Cronbach α = 0.83; proportion of variance extracted = 66%; Composite reliability = 0.83; Average 
variance extracted = 55%; 2-value = 6.69 (2); p-value = 0.04; RMSEA = 0.075; CFI/TLI = 0.992 / 0.977; SMRM 
= 0.016. 
1 Responsibility for pricing decisions has been clearly 
assigned to organizational individuals in our firm. 
0.62 0.49 1 7 5.80 1.35 
2 Within our organization, formal internal communica-
tion channels are followed when working on pricing. 
0.75 0.76 1 7 5.06 1.52 
3 In our firm, the rationale for pricing decisions is well 
documented and filed for future reference. 
0.62 0.45 1 7 4.89 1.50 
4 To coordinate the parts of our organization working 
in pricing, standard operating procedures have been 
established. 
0.63 0.51 1 7 4.60 1.66 
 
CENTRALIZATION:  
      
Fit indices: Cronbach α = 0.83; proportion of variance extracted = 67%; Composite reliability = 0.84; Average 
variance extracted = 57%; 2-value (degrees of freedom) = 1.19 (2); p-value = 0.38; RMSEA = 0.000; CFI/TLI = 
1.00 / 1.00; SMRM = 0.008. 
1 Important pricing decisions have to be referred to 
someone higher up for a final answer. 
0.56 0.37 1 7 5.97 1.33 
2 People involved in important pricing decisions have 
to ask their boss before they do almost anything. 
0.68 0.60 1 7 5.87 1.06 
3 Employees making important pricing decisions need 
to have the boss's approval first. 
0.75 0.79 1 7 5.57 1.34 
4 Managers generally make important pricing 
decisions only after checking them with someone on 
the management team. 
0.64 0.51 1 7 5.50 1.45 
 
SPECIALIZATION: 
     
Fit indices: Cronbach α = 0.75; proportion of variance extracted = 70%; 
Composite reliability = 0.75; Average variance extracted = 51% 
    
1 In our organization there are "pricing specialists" 
who direct their efforts to price management. 
0.57 0.50 1 7 3.23 2.14 
2 Standardized training procedures exist for jobs that 
involve pricing activities. 
0.59 0.54 1 7 2.67 1.71 
3 Written position descriptions are provided to pricing 
specialists. 
0.56 0.46 1 7 2.65 2.05 
 
TOP-MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT: 
      
Fit indices: Cronbach α = 0.87; proportion of variance extracted = 80%; 
Composite reliability = 0.88; Average variance extracted = 70% 
    
 
Table(s)
Latent construct and survey items 
Please indicate to what extend the following statements 
characterise performance indicators available in your 
company. 
Item-to- 
Total 
correlati
on 
Indicator 
reliability  
Min Max Item 
mean 
Std. 
dev. 
1 Our top management considers efforts to improve 
price management to be a valuable investment of 
resources. 
0.72 0.60 1 7 5.34 1.44 
2 Our top management considers our pricing activities 
as a critical success factor. 
0.82 0.87 1 7 5.90 1.21 
3 Our top management intends to increase the 
company's pricing awareness. 
0.73 0.64 1 7 5.58 1.34 
 
PRICING PROCESS EFFECTIVENESS: 
      
Fit indices: Cronbach α = 0.88; proportion of variance extracted = 74%; Composite reliability = 0.89; Average 
variance extracted = 66%; 2-value (degrees of freedom) = 3.81 (2); p-value = 0.15; RMSEA = 0.046; CFI/TLI = 
0.998 / 0.994; SMRM = 0.009. 
1 Our customers usually pay the prices we set. 0.71 0.58 1 7 4.40 1.29 
2 We manage to avoid price reductions. 0.78 0.73 1 7 4.23 1.29 
3 In bargaining situations vis-á-vis customers we reach 
our price-related targets. 
0.77 0.69 2 7 4.58 1.29 
4 We successfully fight price erosion. 0.74 0.64 1 7 4.46 1.43 
PRICING PROCESS EFFICIENCY: 
      
Fit indices: Cronbach α = 0.76; proportion of variance extracted = 68%; 
Composite reliability = 0.77; Average variance extracted = 52% 
    
1 We achieve efficiency in all activities of the price 
management. 
0.64 0.63 1 7 4.28 1.32 
2 We perform pricing activities right the first time. 0.61 0.54 1 7 4.29 1.25 
3 The amount of time and effort we spend in price 
management activities is worthwhile. 
 
0.54 0.40 1 7 5.36 1.17 
PRICING PROCESS ADAPTABILITY:       
Fit indices: Cronbach α = 0.83; proportion of variance extracted = 75%; 
Composite reliability = 0.84; Average variance extracted = 63% 
    
1 We adapt our pricing approach quickly to the 
changing needs of customers. 
0.61 0.44 1 7 4.62 1.38 
2 We use our pricing to react quickly to new market 
threats. 
0.77 0.86 1 7 4.30 1.56 
3 We use our pricing to quickly exploit new market 
opportunities. 
0.69 0.60 1 7 4.05   1.48 
Latent construct and survey items 
Please indicate to what extend the following statements 
characterise performance indicators available in your 
company. 
Item-to- 
Total 
correlati
on 
Indicator 
reliability  
Min Max Item 
mean 
Std. 
dev. 
 
 
 
QUALITY OF COOPERATION: 
In price management, the departments involved… 
      
Fit indices: Cronbach α = 0.92; proportion of variance extracted = 81%; Composite reliability = 0.92; Average 
variance extracted = 75%; 2-value (degrees of freedom) = 0.67 (2); p-value = 0.72; RMSEA = 0.000; CFI/TLI = 
1.000 / 1.000; SMRM = 0.003. 
1 …act in concert. 0.80 0.70 2 7 4.96 1.31 
2 …have few problems in their cooperation. 0.84 0.79 1 7 4.96 1.30 
3 …achieve their common goals. 0.82 0.74 2 7 5.07 1.29 
4 …trust each other. 0.83 0.76 2 7 5.05 1.37 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: 
Relative to your competitors, how has your organization 
performed with respect to ... 
      
Fit indices: Cronbach α = 0.95; proportion of variance extracted = 91%; 
Composite reliability = 0.95; Average variance extracted = 87% 
    
1 EBIT. 0.91 0.89 1 7 4.83 1.27 
2 ROS. 0.93 0.94 1 7 4.80 1.27 
3 ROI. 0.88 0.80 1 7 4.78 1.24 
MARKET PERFORMANCE: 
Relative to your competitors, how has your organization 
performed with respect to ... 
      
Fit indices: Cronbach α = 0.88; proportion of variance extracted = 80%; 
Composite reliability = 0.88; Average variance extracted = 70% 
    
1 Market share development. 0.77 0.73 1 7 4.84 1.20 
2 Revenue development. 0.77 0.74 2 7 5.00 1.18 
3 Attracting new customers. 0.74 0.64 1 7 4.79 1.19 
Latent construct and survey items 
Please indicate to what extend the following statements 
characterise performance indicators available in your 
company. 
Item-to- 
Total 
correlati
on 
Indicator 
reliability  
Min Max Item 
mean 
Std. 
dev. 
 
 
 
 
DIFFERENTIATION STRATEGY: 
      
Fit indices: Cronbach α = 0.80; proportion of variance extracted = 62%; Composite reliability = 0.80; Average 
variance extracted = 50%; 2-value (degrees of freedom) = 5.25 (2); p-value = 0.07; RMSEA = 0.062; CFI/TLI = 
0.99 / 0.98; SMRM = 0.016. 
1 Competitive advantage through superior products. 0.65 0.60 1 7 5.62 1.23 
2 Creating superior customer value through services 
accompanying the products. 
0.56 0.40 1 7 5.33 1.40 
3 New product development. 0.62 0.54 1 7 5.34 1.44 
4 Building up a premium product or brand image. 0.60 0.45 1 7 4.96 1.49 
COMPETITIVE INTENSITY: 
      
Fit indices: Cronbach α = 0.86; proportion of variance extracted = 78%; 
Composite reliability = 0.86; Average variance extracted = 68% 
    
1 Competition in our industry is cutthroat. 0.76 0.76 1 7 5.58 1.23 
2 There are many "promotion wars" in our industry. 0.70 0.58 1 7 5.12 1.48 
3 Anything that one competitor can offer, others can 
match readily.  
0.74 0.69 1 7 5.43 1.32 
 
      
 
 
 
  
Table 6: Statistical cluster description 
 
Category Variable 
 
 
 
(Cluster size) 
Stuck in 
the Middle 
 
 
(8.4%) 
Monocracy 
 
 
 
(12.9%) 
Talk the 
Talk 
 
 
(11.9% ) 
Rock-Solid 
Handcrafter 
 
 
(47.3%) 
Eager 
Beaver 
 
 
(19.6%) 
Structural 
dimensions 
Formalization 4.5 (c) 4.0 (b) 3.2 (a) 5.6 (d) 5.9 (d) 
Centralization 4.8 (a) 5.8 (c) 5.2 (b) 6.0 (c) 5.7 (c) 
Specialization 4.3 (c) 1.8 (a) 1.7 (a) 2.2 (b) 5.2 (d) 
Nonstructural 
dimensions 
Dispersion of 
influence 
59.0 (c) 53.3 (ab) 59.6 (c) 51.5 (a) 57.2 (bc) 
Top-
management 
involvement 
4.6 (b) 3.4 (a) 5.8 (c) 6.0 (c) 6.4 (d) 
Pricing-level 
outcomes 
Pricing process 
effectiveness 
4.0 (a) 4.2 (ab) 4.1 (a) 4.5 (bc) 4.6 (c) 
Pricing process 
efficiency 
4.3 (b) 3.9 (b) 3.8 (a) 4.9 (c) 5.1 (c) 
Pricing process 
adaptability 
4.1 (ab) 3.8 (a) 3.8 (a) 4.5 (bc) 4.7 (c) 
Quality of 
cooperation in 
pricing 
4.1 (a) 4.4 (a) 4.3 (a) 5.3 (b) 5.4 (b) 
Firm-level 
outcomes 
Relative 
financial 
performance 
4.5 (a) 4.3 (a) 4.5 (a) 5.0 (b) 5.0 (b) 
Relative market 
performance 
4.7 (bc) 4.7 (ab) 4.3 (a) 5.0 (bc) 5.1 (c) 
ROS* 0.8% (a) 2.9% (b) 
Notes: Reported values are mean values. In each row, cluster means that have the same letter in brackets are not 
significantly different (p< .05) on the basis of Duncan's multiple-range test. Means in the lowest band are 
assigned "a," means in the next highest band "b," and so forth. Means in the highest band are printed in bold. 
* ROS data were pooled with objective performance data on the basis of subjective outcome measures owing to 
the smaller sample size; means of the two groups were compared by a t-test, and differences were significantly 
different (p< .05)  
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire items 
 
 
Construct Items 
Formalization 
(adapted from Argouslidis and Indounas 2010; 
Workman, Homburg and Jensen 2003; reflective scale, 
scored on a seven-point scale with anchors 1 = “strongly 
disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 Responsibility for pricing decisions has been clearly assigned to organizational individuals in our firm. 
 Within our organization, formal internal communication channels are followed when working on 
pricing. 
 In our firm, the rationale for pricing decisions is well-documented and filed for future reference  
 To coordinate the parts of our organization working in pricing, standard operating procedures have been 
established. 
 In our firm, prior to submitting price quotations, we keep detailed records of the policies and methods 
used to set the prices on a standard form (document) pertaining to price decision-making.*  
Centralization 
(adapted from Cadogan et al. 2005; Frenzen et al. 2010; 
Menon, Jaworski and Kohli 1997; reflective scale, 
scored on a seven-point scale with anchors 1 = “strongly 
disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 Important pricing decisions have to be referred to someone higher up for a final answer.  
 People involved in important pricing decisions have to ask their boss before they do almost anything.  
 Employees making important pricing decisions need to have the boss's approval first.  
 Managers generally make important pricing decisions only after checking them with someone of the 
management team. 
 People are allowed flexibility in getting pricing-related work done. (R)* 
Specialization 
(adapted from Olson, Slater and Hult 2005; Vorhies and 
Morgan 2003; reflective scale, scored on a seven-point 
scale with anchors 1 = “strongly disagree” and 7 = 
“strongly agree”) 
 In our organization there are "pricing specialists" who direct their efforts to price management.  
 Pricing is everybody’s task and is performed by employees who are generalist for a wide variety of 
tasks. (R)* 
 Standardized training procedures exist for jobs that involve pricing activities.  
 Written position descriptions are provided to pricing specialists.  
Top Down Commitment  
(adapted from Cadogan et al. 2005; Verhoef and 
Leeflang 2009; reflective scale, scored on a seven-point 
scale with anchors 1 = “strongly disagree” and 7 = 
“strongly agree”) 
 Our top management considers efforts to improve price management to be a valuable investment of 
resources.  
 Our top management considers our pricing activities as a critical success factor.  
 Our top management intends to increase the company's pricing awareness. 
 Our management formally promotes and encourages employees to deal with pricing issues. 
Pricing process effectiveness 
(based on Dutta, Zbaracki and Bergen 2003; reflective 
scale, scored on a seven-point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 We manage to enforce our anticipated prices in the market.* 
 Our customers usually pay the prices we set. 
 We manage to avoid price reductions.  
 In bargaining situations vis-á-vis customers we reach our price-related targets.  
 We successfully fight price erosion. 
Pricing process efficiency 
(adapted from Ayers, Dahlstrom and Skinner 1997; 
Krohmer, Homburg and Workman 2002; reflective 
scale, scored on a seven-point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 We achieve efficiency in all activities of the price management process  
 We perform pricing activities right the first time. 
 The amount of time and effort we spend in price management activities is worthwhile. 
 The quality of our pricing decisions justify the amount of time and effort we invest in pricing 
decisions.* 
Appendicies
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Pricing process adaptability 
(adapted from Homburg, Workman, and Jensen 2002; 
Krohmer, Homburg and Workman 2002; reflective 
scale, scored on a seven-point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 We adapt our pricing adequately to changes in the business environment of your business unit.*  
 We adapt our pricing approach quickly to the changing needs of customers. 
 We use our pricing to react quickly to new market threats. 
 We use our pricing to quickly exploit new market opportunities. 
Quality of cooperation  
(adapted from Homburg and Jensen 2007; reflective 
scale, scored on a seven-point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
In price management, the departments involved… 
 …collaborate frictionless.* 
 …act in concert. 
 …have few problems in their cooperation. 
 …achieve their common goals. 
 …trust each other. 
Financial performance 
(adapted from Krohmer, Homburg and Workman 2002; 
Vorhies and Morgan 2003; Workman, Homburg and 
Jensen 2003; reflective scale, scored on a seven-point 
scale with anchors 1 = “very poor” and 7 = “excellent”) 
 
Relative to your competitors, how has your organization performed with respect to ... 
 EBIT 
 ROS 
 ROI 
 Cash-Flow* 
Market performance  
(adapted from Krohmer, Homburg and Workman 2002; 
Vorhies and Morgan 2003; Workman, Homburg and 
Jensen 2003; reflective scale, scored on a seven-point 
scale with anchors 1 = “very poor” and 7 = “excellent”) 
Relative to your competitors, how has your organization performed with respect to ... 
 Market share* 
 Market share development 
 Revenue development 
 Attracting new customers 
Differentiation strategy  
(adapted from Homburg, Workman and Krohmer 1999; 
reflective scale, scored on a seven-point scale with 
anchors 1 = “strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly 
agree”) 
 Competitive advantage through superior products. 
 Creating superior customer value through services accompanying the products. 
 New product development. 
 Building up a premium product or brand image. 
 Obtaining high prices from the market.* 
Competitive intensity  
(adapted from Workman, Homburg, Jensen 2003; 
Jaworski and Kohli 1993; reflective scale, scored on a 
seven-point scale with anchors 1 = “strongly disagree” 
and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 Competition in our industry is cutthroat. 
 There are many "promotion wars" in our industry. 
 Anything that one competitor can offer, others can match readily. 
 Price competition is a hallmark of our industry.* 
 
* Items dropped during scale purification 
(R) Reverse-coded item 
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Appendix 2: Verbal cluster description 
 
Category Variable 
 
 
(Cluster size) 
Stuck in the 
Middle 
 
(8.4%) 
Monocracy 
 
 
(12.9%) 
Talk the Talk 
 
 
(11.9% ) 
Rock-Solid 
Handcrafter 
 
(47.3%) 
Eager Beaver 
 
 
(19.6%) 
Structural 
dimensions 
Formalization Moderately 
high 
Moderately 
low 
Low High High 
Centralization Low High Medium High High 
Specialization Moderately 
high 
Low Low 
Moderately 
low 
High 
Non-
structural 
dimensions 
Dispersion of 
influence 
High 
Low – 
medium 
High Low 
High - 
medium 
Top-
management 
involvement 
Moderately 
Low 
Low 
Moderately 
high 
Moderately 
High 
High 
Pricing-
level 
outcomes 
Pricing process 
effectiveness 
Low Low-medium Low Medium-high High 
Pricing process 
efficiency 
Medium Medium Low High High 
Pricing process 
adaptability 
Moderately 
low 
Low Low 
Moderately 
high 
High 
Quality of 
cooperation in 
pricing 
Low Low Low High High 
Firm-level 
outcomes 
Financial 
performance 
Low Low Low High High 
Market 
performance 
Medium-high 
Low- 
medium 
Low 
Medium- 
high 
High 
ROS* Low High 
Notes: Means in the highest band are printed in bold; means in the lowest band are in italics. 
* ROS data were pooled with objective performance data owing to the smaller sample size  
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Appendix 3: Results of ANCOVA 
 
 Total model Cluster Competitive 
intensity 
Differentiation 
strategy 
Firm size 
 Mean 
of 
Squares 
F 
(p) 
Mean 
of 
Squares 
F 
(p) 
Mean 
of 
Squares 
F 
(p) 
Mean 
of 
Squares 
F 
(p) 
Mean 
of 
Squares 
F 
(p) 
Pricing 
process 
effectiveness 
13.5 
13.3 
(0.000) 
14.7 
3.60 
(0.007) 
31.2 
30.60 
(0.000) 
43.0 
42.22 
(0.000) 
1.8 
1.71 
(0.191) 
Pricing 
process 
efficiency 
17.4 
22.48 
(0.000) 
19.1 
24.68 
(0.000) 
0.3 
0.39 
(0.531) 
17.8 
22.98 
(0.000) 
5.3 
6.89 
(0.009) 
Pricing 
process 
adaptability 
13.1 
9.14 
(0.000) 
8.46 
5.93 
(0.000) 
23.2 
16.22 
(0.000) 
8.3 
5.81 
(0.016) 
10.6 
7.45 
(0.007) 
Quality of 
cooperation 
in pricing 
18.7 
16.8 
(0.000) 
22.8 
20.48 
(0.000) 
0.2 
0.20 
(0.652) 
7.2 
6.41 
(0.012) 
11.2 
10.20 
(0.002) 
Financial 
performance 
10.9 
8.42 
(0.000) 
4.4 
3.39 
(0.010) 
6.8 
5.2 
(0.023) 
31.2 
24.05 
(0.000) 
6.3 
4.86 
(0.028) 
Market 
performance 
6.5 
6.48 
(0.000) 
3.8 
3.65 
(0.006) 
0.6 
0.55 
(0.460) 
20.21 
19.41 
(0.000) 
0.0 
0.010 
(0.920) 
ROS* 65.5 
3.7 
(0.007) 
17.8 
5.0 
(0.027) 
5.3 
0.30 
(0.586) 
87.0 
4.90 
(0.028) 
13.8 
0.78 
(0.380) 
  * Test for ROS data based on a pooled sample of two groups 
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Appendix 4: Scale Items for Constructs 
 
 
 
 
Construct Items 
Formalization 
(adapted from Argouslidis and 
Indounas 2010; Workman, 
Homburg and Jensen 2003; 
reflective scale, scored on a seven-
point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = 
“strongly agree”) 
 Responsibility for pricing decisions has been clearly assigned to 
organizational individuals in our firm. 
 Within our organization, formal internal communication channels are 
followed when working on pricing. 
 In our firm, the rationale for pricing decisions is well documented and 
filed for future reference  
 To coordinate the parts of our organization working in pricing, 
standard operating procedures have been established. 
 In our firm, prior to submitting price quotations, we keep detailed 
records of the policies and methods used to set the prices on a standard 
form (document) pertaining to price decision-making.*  
Centralization 
(adapted from Cadogan et al. 2005; 
Frenzen et al. 2010; Menon, 
Jaworski and Kohli 1997; reflective 
scale, scored on a seven-point scale 
with anchors 1 = “strongly disagree” 
and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 Important pricing decisions have to be referred to someone higher up 
for a final answer.  
 People involved in important pricing decisions have to ask their boss 
before they do almost anything.  
 Employees making important pricing decisions need to have the boss's 
approval first.  
 Managers generally make important pricing decisions only after 
checking them with someone on the management team. 
 People are allowed flexibility in getting pricing-related work done. 
(R)* 
Specialization 
(adapted from Olson, Slater and 
Hult 2005; Vorhies and Morgan 
2003; reflective scale, scored on a 
seven-point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = 
“strongly agree”) 
 In our organization there are "pricing specialists" who direct their 
efforts to price management.  
 Pricing is everybody’s task and is performed by employees who are 
generalist for a wide variety of tasks. (R)* 
 Standardized training procedures exist for jobs that involve pricing 
activities.  
 Written position descriptions are provided to pricing specialists.  
Top-management involvement 
(adapted from Cadogan et al. 2005; 
Verhoef and Leeflang 2009; 
reflective scale, scored on a seven-
point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = 
“strongly agree”) 
 Our top management considers efforts to improve price management 
to be a valuable investment of resources.  
 Our top management considers our pricing activities as a critical 
success factor.  
 Our top management intends to increase the company's pricing 
awareness. 
 Our management formally promotes and encourages employees to 
deal with pricing issues. 
Pricing process effectiveness 
(based on Dutta, Zbaracki and 
Bergen 2003; reflective scale, 
scored on a seven-point scale with 
anchors 1 = “strongly disagree” and 
7 = “strongly agree”) 
 We manage to enforce our anticipated prices in the market.* 
 Our customers usually pay the prices we set. 
 We manage to avoid price reductions.  
 In bargaining situations vis-á-vis customers we reach our price-related 
targets.  
 We successfully fight price erosion. 
Pricing process efficiency 
(adapted from Ayers, Dahlstrom and 
Skinner 1997; Krohmer, Homburg 
and Workman 2002; reflective scale, 
scored on a seven-point scale with 
anchors 1 = “strongly disagree” and 
7 = “strongly agree”) 
 We achieve efficiency in all activities of the price management process  
 We perform pricing activities right the first time. 
 The amount of time and effort we spend in price management activities 
is worthwhile. 
 The quality of our pricing decisions justifies the amount of time and 
effort we invest in pricing decisions.* 
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Pricing process adaptability 
(adapted from Homburg, Workman 
and Jensen 2002; Krohmer, 
Homburg and Workman 2002; 
reflective scale, scored on a seven-
point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = 
“strongly agree”) 
 We adapt our pricing adequately to changes in the business environment 
of your business unit.*  
 We adapt our pricing approach quickly to the changing needs of 
customers. 
 We use our pricing to react quickly to new market threats. 
 We use our pricing to quickly exploit new market opportunities. 
Quality of cooperation (adapted 
from Homburg and Jensen 2007; 
reflective scale, scored on a seven-
point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = 
“strongly agree”) 
In price management, the departments involved… 
 …collaborate frictionless.* 
 …act in concert. 
 …have few problems in their cooperation. 
 …achieve their common goals. 
 …trust each other. 
Financial performance 
(adapted from Krohmer, Homburg 
and Workman 2002; Vorhies and 
Morgan 2003; Workman, Homburg 
and Jensen 2003; reflective scale, 
scored on a seven-point scale with 
anchors 1 = “very poor” and 7 = 
“excellent”) 
 
Relative to your competitors, how has your organization performed with 
respect to ... 
 EBIT 
 ROS 
 ROI 
 Cash flow* 
Market performance (adapted 
from Krohmer, Homburg and 
Workman 2002; Vorhies and 
Morgan 2003; Workman, Homburg 
and Jensen 2003; reflective scale, 
scored on a seven-point scale with 
anchors 1 = “very poor” and 7 = 
“excellent”) 
Relative to your competitors, how has your organization performed with 
respect to ... 
 Market share* 
 Market share development 
 Revenue development 
 Attracting new customers 
Differentiation strategy (adapted 
from Homburg, Workman and 
Krohmer 1999; reflective scale, 
scored on a seven-point scale with 
anchors 1 = “strongly disagree” and 
7 = “strongly agree”) 
 Competitive advantage through superior products. 
 Creating superior customer value through services accompanying the 
products. 
 New product development. 
 Building up a premium product or brand image. 
 Obtaining high prices from the market.* 
Competitive intensity (adapted 
from Workman, Homburg, Jensen 
2003; Jaworski and Kohli 1993; 
reflective scale, scored on a seven-
point scale with anchors 1 = 
“strongly disagree” and 7 = 
“strongly agree”) 
 Competition in our industry is cutthroat. 
 There are many "promotion wars" in our industry. 
 Anything that one competitor can offer, others can match readily. 
 Price competition is a hallmark of our industry.* 
 
 
* Items dropped during scale purification 
(R) reverse-coded item 
 
 
